We investigated two seemingly contradictory phenomena: the Advantage of the First Mentioned Participant (participants mentioned first in a sentence are more accessible than participants mentioned second) and the Advantage of the Most Recent Clause (concepts mentioned in the most recent clause are more accessible than concepts mentioned in an earlier clause). We resolved this contradiction by measuring how quickly comprehenders accessed participants mentioned in the first versus second clauses of two-clause sentences. Our data supported the following hypotheses: Comprehenders represent each clause of a two-clause sentence in its own mental substructure. Comprehenders have greatest access to information in the substructure that they are currently developing; that is, they have greatest access to the most recent clause. However, at some point, the first clause becomes more accessible because the substructure representing the first clause of a two-clause sentence serves as a foundation for the whole sentence-level representation. 10 !989 Academic Pre�s. Inc.
What cognitive processes are involved in language comprehension? And what are the mental representations like that compre henders create during comprehension? As an initial step in understanding these pro cesses and representations, we envision language comprehension as structure build ing, and we suggest that some of the cogni tive processes involved in comprehension can be described by a very simple frame work that we call the structure building fr ame work (Gernsbacher, 1985; in press We conducted this research while supported by NSF Grant BNS 85-10096, and we prepared the manu script while supported by NIH Research Career De velopment Award K04 NS-01376 and Air Force Office of Sponsored Research Grants 89-0258 and 89-0111 (all grants were awarded to MAG). Patrick Carey, Lori Lott, Julia Moravcsik, and Karen Wisegarver helped in many stages of this research, and we are especially indebted to Rachel Robertson and Kathy Varner. Doug Hintzman motivated us to conduct Experiment 4, and Gary Dell inspired Experiment 5. The manu script benefitted from the comments of three anony mous reviewers. We reported this research at the 27th annual meeting of the Psychonomic Society, Chicago, IL, November, 1988 . Please address corre spondence and reprint requests to Dr. M. A. Gerns bacher, Department of Psychology, University of Or egon, Eugene, OR, 97403-1227 or mortong@oregon. uoregon.edu.
(a), (b); Gernsbacher & Hargreaves, 1988, in press ).
According to the structure building framework, the goal of comprehension is to build a coherent, mental representation or "structure" of the information being com prehended. To build these structures, sev eral component processes are involved. First, comprehenders must lay a foundation for their mental structures. Next, compre henders must develop their mental struc tures by mapping on information when that incoming information coheres with the pre vious information. However, if the incom ing information is less continuous, compre henders employ a different process: They shift and initiate a new substructure. For· this reason, most representations comprise several branching substructures.
In this paper, we suggest how the struc ture building framework can resolve two seemingly contradictory phenomena. Both phenomena provide insights to the pro cesses involved in language comprehension and the structure of comprehenders' mental representations.
The first phenomenon is what we call the advantage of the fi rst-mentioned partici pant. The advantage is this: After compre-hending a sentence involving two partici pants, the participant mentioned first in the sentence is considerably easier to access than the participant mentioned second. For instance, after hearing or reading the sen tence.
(I) Tina beat Lisa in the state tennis match.
comprehenders verify that Tina was in the sentence considerably faster than they do after hearing or reading (2) Lisa beat Tina in the state tennis match.
So, the first-mentioned participant (Tina) is more easily accessed from comprehenders' mental representations, and that is what we mean by the advantage of the first mentioned participant.
The advantage of the first-mentioned par ticipant has been observed numerous times by different researchers (Chang, 1980; Cor bett & Chang, 1983; in press (a); Gernsbacher & Hargreaves, 1988; Stevenson, 1986; Von Eckardt & Potter, 1985) . The advantage does not depend on some strategy that subjects might employ when they think that they only have to re member the names of sentence participants as the advantage occurs even when filler trials test subjects' memory for words that are not participants' names.
One explanation of the advantage of the first-mentioned participant arises from the structure building framework: Perhaps first-mentioned participants are more ac cessible both because they form the foun dations for their sentence-level structures, and because it is through them that subse quent information is mapped onto the de veloping structure.
Other comprehension phenomena sup port this assumption. For instance, a large body of converging data suggests that com prehension slows down when comprehend ers are presumably laying their mental foundations for mental structures. More specifically, the initial word of a sentence takes longer to read than other words in that sentence except the final word (Aaron son & Ferres, 1983; Aaronson & Scarbor ough, 1976; Chang, 1980) . 1 In fact, the same word is read more slowly when it occurs at the beginning of its sentence or phrase than when it occurs later (Aaronson & Scarbor ough, 1976) .
During spoken language comprehension, phonemes and words are identified more slowly when they occur at the beginning of their sentences or phrases than when they occur later (Cairns & Kamerman, 1975; Cutler & Foss, 1977; Foss, 1969; 1982; Hakes, 197 1; Marslen-Wilson, Tyler, & Seidenberg, 1978; Shields, McHugh, & Martin, 1974) .
The first open class word of a sentence elicits a larger N400 than later occurring words (Kutas, Van Petten, & Besson, 1988) . 2 The N400 is the negative component of the event-related brain wave that occurs about 400 ms after the stimulus. The N400 is associated with difficulty in processing; for instance, low frequency words and words with a low cloze probability also elicit large N400s.
So the reading-time data, the event related brain wave data, and the phoneme or word-monitoring data display the pattern expected if comprehenders use initial words to lay a foundation for their mental structures representing larger units, such as phrases, clauses, and sentences. Bu t importantly-this pattern is not displayed 1 Initial words are not always read most slowly when subjects are required to recall (as opposed to freely read) the stimulus sentences. Neither are they read most slowly when subjects must perform a sec ond task immediately after they finish reading each sentence (e.g., answer a question or press a key to signal congruence or anomaly). In preparation of this second task. subjects often delay reading the last words of the sentences causing those last words to manifest extremely long reading times. Furthermore. initial words are more likely to be content words than function words.
:! Open class words are nouns, verbs. most adjec tives. and ly adverbs. in any of these data when the stimuli do not lend themselves to coherent mental struc tures-for example, when the sentences are scrambled, self-embedded, or extensively right branching (Foss & Lynch, 1969; Hakes & Foss, 1970; Van Petten & Kutas, 1988) .
Furthermore, the first word of a sen tence, or a picture of the first word, pro vides a better cue for recalling the entire sentence than do later occurring words (Bock & Irwin, 1980; Prentice, 1967; Turner & Rommetveit, 1968) . This finding suggests that the initial words of a sentence serve as a foundation onto which subse quent information is added.
So, the advantage of the first-mentioned participant might arise because first mentioned participants form the founda tions for their sentence-level representa tions, and because it is through them that subsequent information is mapped onto the developing representation. However, other explanations of the advantage of the first mentioned participant draw on the linguis tic structure of English. For example, first mentioned participants might be more ac cessible because in English declarative sentences they are virtually always the syn tactic relation known as "subjects," and they typically also fill the semantic role known as "agents."
In Gernsbacher and Hargreaves (1988) , we tried to untangle these linguistic factors from a factor we called simply "order of mention." In these experiments, subjects read sentences such as (3) Tina beat Lisa in the state tennis match.
Each sentence appeared word by word in the center of a computer screen. After the last word of each sentence disappeared, a test name appeared, and the subjects veri fied whether that name had occurred in the sentence they just finished reading.
Our first experiment and its replication demonstrated that the advantage of the first-mentioned participant does not depend on semantic agency. That is, the participant Tina is just as accessible when she is the semantic agent, as in sentence (3) above, as when she is the semantic patient, as in (4) Tina was beaten by Lisa in the state tennis match.
The crucial issue is whether Tina is men tioned first, as she is in sentences (3) and (4), or whether Tina is mentioned second, as she is in (5) Lisa beat Tina in the state tennis match.
(6) Lisa was beaten by Tina in the state tennis match.
Our third experiment and its replication investigated whether the advantage of the first-mentioned participant depends on the first-mentioned participants being literally the initial words of their stimulus sen tences. If so, our laboratory task might be somewhat to blame as the first word of each sentence is typically preceded by an atten tion-getting warning signal, which is itself preceded by a brief blank period.
To investigate this, we manipulated whether an adverbial phrase like two weeks ago was preposed at the beginning of the sentence, as in (7) Two weeks ago Tina mailed Lisa a box full of clothes.
Or it was postposed at the end of the sen tence, as in (8) Tina mailed Lisa a box full of clothes two weeks ago.
Or it did not occur at all, as in (9) Tina mailed Lisa a box full of clothes.
The advantage of the first-mentioned par ticipant maintains regardless of whether the first-mentioned participants are literally the initial words of their stimulus sentences. So, the advantage must depend on each participant's position relative to the other participants.
Our fifth, sixth, and seventh experiments investigated whether the advantage of the first-mentioned participant is due to syntac tic subjecthood. Of course, the typical se quence of events in a subject-verb-object language like English is that the first mentioned participant is the syntactic sub ject. However, in our fifth experiment, the advantage of the first-mentioned partici pant was not attenuated even when the two participants shared subjecthood, as, for ex ample, when both Tina and Lisa were the syntactic subjects, as in ( 10) Tina and Lisa argued during the meeting.
as opposed to Tina being the sole subject, as in (11) Tina argued with Lisa during the meeting.
In fact, in our sixth and seventh experi ments, the advantage of the first-mentioned participant was not attenuated even when the first-mentioned participants were no longer their sentences' syntactic subjects, as in (12) Because of Tina, Lisa was evicted from the apartment.
We concluded that the advantage of the first-mentioned participant does not arise from any of the linguistic factors that we investigated. Instead we suggested that the advantage results from general cognitive processes that occur naturally during com prehension. These processes involve laying a foundation and mapping subsequent in formation onto that foundation.
However, the advantage of the first mentioned participant seems to contradict a second well-known advantage-what we call the advantage of the most recent clause. The advantage is this: Immediately after subjects hear or read a two-clause sen tence, words from the most recently heard or read clause are more accessible than words from an earlier clause (Bever & Townsend, 1978; Caplan, 1972; Chang, 1980; Flores d'Arcais, 1978; Jarvella, 1970 Jarvella, , 1971 Jarvella, , 1973 Jarvella, , 1979 Jarvella & Herman, 1972; Mars len-Wilson et al., 1978; von Eckardt & Potter, 1985) .
For example, the word oil is more acces sible immediately after the sentence, (13) Now that artists are working fewer hours, oil prints are rare.
than it is immediately after the sentence, (14) Now that artists are working in oil, prints are rare (Caplan, 1972) . Presumably this advantage arises because the word oil was in the most recent clause in sentence (13). So the ad vantage of the most recent clause is also caused by the order in which concepts are mentioned, but it is an advantage for the most recently or second-mentioned con cept.
How can this discrepancy be resolved? Perhaps this second phenomenon is also at tributable to structure building. According to the structure building framework, lan guage comprehension often requires shift ing to initiate a new substructure. Presum ably comprehenders shift to initiate a new substructure when the incoming informa tion is less related to the previous informa tion, for instance, when the topic, point of view, or setting of a passage changes.
Indeed, words and sentences that change the ongoing topic, point of view, or setting take substantially longer to comprehend than those that continue it. This finding suggests that such words and sentences trigger comprehenders to shift and begin laying the foundation for a new substruc ture (Anderson, Garrod, & Sanford, 1983; Black, Turner, & Bower, 1979; Daneman & Carpenter, 1983; Dee-Lucas. Just, Carpen ter, & Daneman, 1982; Haberlandt, Berian, & Sandson, 1980; Lesgold, Roth, & Curtis, 1979; Lorch, Lorch, & Mitchell, 1985; Mandler & Goodman. 1982; Olson, Duffy. & Mack, 1980) .
Comprehenders also have more difficulty retrieving information presented before a change in topic, point of view, or setting than they do retrieving information pre sented after such a change. This finding suggests that information presented before the change is represented in one substruc ture, while information presented after the change is represented in another (Anderson et al., 1983; Clements, 1979; Mandler & Goodman, 1982) .
When building their representations of sentences, comprehenders presumably also shift and initiate a new substructure when speakers and writers signal the beginning of a new clause or phrase. In fact, one of Kim ball's (1973) seven parsing principles was that "the construction of a new node is sig nalled by the occurrence of a grammatical function word." So comprehenders might-as Clark and Clark (1977) sug gested-use signals such as determiners and quantifiers to initiate a substructure representing a new noun phrase. And they might use subordinating and coordinating conjunctions as signals to initiate a sub structure representing a new clause.
Thus, the structure building framework can account for two seemingly contradic tory phenomena-the advantage of the first-mentioned participant and the advan tage of the most recent clause. The frame work accounts for these two phenomena by making the following assumptions: Com prehenders represent each clause of a mul ticlause sentence in its own substructure. Comprehenders have greatest access to the information that is represented in the sub structure that they are currently develop ing, in other words, the most recent clause. However, at some point, the first clause be comes more accessible than other clauses because the substructure representing the first clause of a multiclause sentence serves as a foundation for the whole sentence level representation.
The experiments reported here tested these assumptions. In each experiment, we measured the accessibility of sentence par ticipants in two-clause sentences, for exam ple, (15) Tina gathered the kindling, and Lisa set up the tent.
As in sentence (15), the first-mentioned participants (e.g., Tina) were the syntactic subjects of the first clauses, and the sec ond-mentioned participants (e. g., Lisa)
were the syntactic subjects of the second clauses. By measuring how rapidly subjects accessed these two sentence participants, we investigated how comprehenders build their mental representations of sentence clauses.
E XPERIMENT 1 ln. our first experiment we tested the structure building framework's assumption that comprehenders have greatest access to information represented in the substructure that they are currently building. To test this assumption, we wanted to catch compre henders when they were just finishing building their representations of the second clause. If we could capture that point, we expected to find an advantage of the most recent clause-in other words, an advan tage for the second-mentioned participant. To capture that point, we presented the test names coincident with the last words in the sentences but at a different location on the computer screen. We supposed that by the time our subjects shifted their eyes and their attention (Posner, 1980) to the test names, our coincident presentation was comparable to an extremely short delay.
Method
Materials and design. We constructed 48 sentence sets. An example sentence set ap pears in Table I . Each sentence set com prised six versions of a prototype sentence. The six versions resulted from factorially manipulating two variables: (!) whether the test name was the first-versus second- Tina gathered the kindling as Lisa set up the tent. As Lisa set up the tent, Tina gathered the kindling. As Tina gathered the kindling, Lisa set up the tent. Lisa set up the tent as Tina gathered the kindling. Tina gathered the kindling, and Lisa set up the tent. Lisa set up the tent, and Tina gathered the kindling. mentioned participant (in other words, whether the test name was the subject of the first clause or the subject of the second clause) and (2) whether the test name was the subject of a main, a subordinate, or a coordinate clause.
Because each clause had to serve as a main, subordinate, and coordinate clause, the two clauses in our stimulus sentence sets had to be relatively equivalent along several dimensions. For example, the ac tion in each clause had to occur at about the same time, last about the same period, and be of equal importance, and neither action could be the impetus for the other.
To construct such sentences, we first se lected a list of verb phrase pairs whose ac tions were relatively equivalent subcompo nents of a larger activity. Some examples are sang a song and played the guitar, dusted the shelves and swept the floor, and did aerobics and lifted weights. All verbs were transitive and took direct objects. To reduce temporal asymmetries, we assigned both verbs to the simple past tense (Haiman & Thompson, 1984) .
We verified our impressions that the members of each verb phrase pair were roughly equal in importance and were likely to occur simultaneously by asking a group of subjects (who did not participate in the actual experiment) to make two judgments: They judged which of the two verb phrases would occur first and which was more im portant. Only verb pairs that showed ap proximate symmetry along these two crite ria-that is, only pairs for which no mem ber was clearly judged as being more important or occurring first-were used in the experimental sentences.
Two common American first names, matched for gender, perceived familiarity, and relative length (in number of characters and syllables), were randomly assigned to each sentence set. Across all the experi mental sentences, half the names were ste reotypically female, and half were stereo typically male. But within each sentence, the two names were stereotypic of the same gender. One name of each pair was ran domly selected as the test name.
When the sentences appeared in their subordinate clause condition, they ap peared with one of the following four tem poral subordinators: as, when, before, and after. Each subordinator was randomly as signed to twelve sentence sets. When the sentences appeared in their coordinate clause conditions, they were conjoined with and.
We constructed 48 lure sentences for "catch trials. " The test names presented for these lure sentences had not occurred in their respective sentences, so the correct answer was "no." The lure sentences re sembled the experimental sentences in syn tactic structure: All comprised two clauses; 16 had initial subordinate clauses; 16 had final subordinate clauses; and in 16 the two clauses were conjoined with and. We also constructed 32 filler sentences whose test names were tested at random points throughout the sentence. Half of the filler test names had occurred in their sentences, and half had not.
To encourage comprehension and atten tion to all aspects of the sentences (not just the participants' names), each experimental sentence was followed by a two-alternative WH-question. Half the questions asked about one of the participants' action, for example, "What did Lisa do?" or "What did Tina do?" The other half asked about one of the participants' identity, for exam ple, "Who gathered the kindling?" or "Who set up the tent?"
Six material sets were formed by ran domly assigning one of the six versions of an experimental sentence set to each mate rial set so that each material set contained eight experimental sentences in each exper imental condition. The 48 experimental sentences were randomly intermixed with the 48 lure sentences and the 32 filler sen tences. All 128 sentences appeared in the same order across the six material sets. Twenty subjects were randomly assigned to each material set so that each subject was exposed to only one version of a sentence set.
Procedure. A trial began with a warning signal, which was a plus sign that appeared for 750 ms in the center of the screen. After that, each word of the sentence appeared in the center of the screen for 300 ms plus 16.667 ms per character. The interval be tween words in the sentence was 150 ms. 3
All stimuli appeared as white letters on a green phosphor screen. The words of the sentences appeared in upper and lower case. A typical lower case letter extended approximately .5 em and .5 to I o of visual angle. A typical five-letter word extended approximately 3 em and 3 to 6° of visual angle (the subjects were not constrained in their seats, so distance to the screen and visual angle varied). The test names ap peared in all uppercase letters at the top of the screen, approximately 15 to 20o of vi sual angle away from where the words of the sentences appeared. The test names re mained on the screen until the subjects pressed a key labelled either "yes" or "no," or until 3 s elapsed.
After each experimental sentence, the words Test Question appeared near the bot tom of the screen for 750 ms. After that, a comprehension question appeared, and be low it, two answer choices. One answer choice was positioned on the left side of the screen, and the other was positioned on the right. Subjects pressed the left response key to select the answer choice on the left side of the screen, or they pressed the right response key to select the answer choice on the right side of the screen. The correct an swer choice appeared equally often on each side. The questions and answer choices re mained on the screen until either the sub jects responded or 10 s elapsed. After each question, the subjects were given accuracy feedback. Subjects were told that their primary task was to read each sentence and answer its comprehension question. They were also told that at some point during each sen tence a name would appear in capital letters at the top of the screen and their task was to verify whether that name had occurred in the sentence they were currently reading. They were told to respond as quickly as they could without making many errors. Subjects practiced on 10 sentences before they began the experiment.
Subjects. One-hundred twenty under graduates at the University of Oregon par ticipated as one means of fulfilling a course requirement. As in all the experiments re ported here, all subjects were native En glish speakers, and no subject participated in more than one experiment. Eight addi tional subjects were replaced because they failed to meet the following criteria: 90% accuracy at responding to "yes" test names, 90% accuracy at responding to "no" test names, and 75% accuracy at an swering the two-choice comprehension questions. The 120 subjects whose data were analyzed answered, on the average, 85% of the comprehension questions cor rectly, and discriminated "yes" from "no" test names with an average d' of 3.47.
Results
The results are displayed in the two left most bars of Fig. 1 . As shown in Fig. 1 , when the test names were presented coin cident with the last words of their sen tences, the most recently read clause was most accessible. In other words, we ob served an advantage of the most recent clause: Second-mentioned participants (M = 1118 ms, SE = 20 ms, 96% accuracy) were considerably more accessible than first-mentioned participants (M = 1065 ms, SE = 19 ms, 93% accuracy), minF' (l, l08) = 12.98, p < .0005. 4 This 60 ms difference 4 We report subjects' average accuracy at respond ing "yes .. to the experimental test names; however. because we screened subjects by this criterion, and therefore artificially truncated these data, we did not statistically analyze them.
• is similar in magnitude to the advantage of the most recent clause observed by others (e.g., Caplan, 1972) . No other main effects or interactions were reliable (all minF' s < 1).
E XPERIMENT 2
Our first experiment demonstrated that immediately after a two-clause sentence is comprehended, the second clause-the more recent clause-is more accessible. This finding supports the structure building framework's assumptions that each clause is represented in its own substructure, and comprehenders have greatest access to in formation represented in the substructure that they are currently developing.
But according to the structure building framework, after comprehenders represent the second clause of a two-clause sentence, they must map that second-clause repre sentation onto their first-clause representa tion. In other words, to fully represent a two-clause sentence, one must incorporate the two substructures.
The goal in our second experiment was to catch comprehenders after they had built substructures to represent each clause, but before they had mapped the substructure representing the second clause onto the substructure representing the first clause. According to the structure building frame work, if we could capture that point, the two clauses should be equally accessible. To capture that point in Experiment 2, we presented the test names !50 ms after the offset of the final words of their sentences.
Method
Experiment 2 was identical to Experi ment 1 except that all test names appeared 150 ms after the offset of their sentences' final words, and there were no filler sen tences. Data from 120 subjects were ana lyzed. Six additional subjects were re placed for failing to meet the criteria de scribed in Experiment 1. The 120 subjects whose data were analyzed answered, on the average, 86% of the comprehension questions correctly, and discriminated "yes" from "no" test names with an aver aged' of 3.54.
Results
The results are displayed in the third and fourth bars of 
E XPERIMENT 3
Our second experiment demonstrated that at some point during the comprehen sion of a two-clause sentence, the two clauses are equally accessible. This finding further supports the structure building framework's assumption that each clause is represented in its own substructure. But ac cording to the structure building frame work, to fully represent a two-clause sen tence, one must incorporate the two sub structures. So if we measured accessibility a little bit later-say, a little more than a second later-no longer should both sub structures be equally accessible. Instead, if comprehenders have successfully mapped the two clauses together, the first clause should be more accessible than the second clause. In other words, we should observe an advantage of the first-mentioned partic ipant. This advantage would suggest that the substructure representing the first clause is serving as the foundation for the whole sentence-level representation. We tested this assumption in our third experi ment by measuring accessibility after we assumed that comprehenders had time to map the substructures representing the two clauses together.
Methods
Materials. We constructed 64 sentence sets. Each sentence set comprised eight versions of a prototype sentence. The eight versions resulted from factorially manipu lating three factors: (1) whether the test name was the first-or second-mentioned participant (in other words, whether the test name was the subject of the first or second clause), (2) whether the test name ' Before prematurely accepting the null hypothesis we conducted a replication experiment (.V = 1281. We observed the same results.
was the subject of a main or subordinate clause, and (3) whether the verbs in the two clauses shared their tense or differed in tense. An example sentence set appears in Table 2 .
When the verbs shared their tense, they were both in the simple past tense, as in Experiments 1 and 2. When the verbs dif fered in tense, one verb remained in the past tense while the other was changed to either the past perfect (for sentences as signed the subordinators after and before) or the past progressive (for sentences as signed the subordinators while and as).
We constructed 64 lure sentences for "catch trials." The test names presented for these lure sentences had not occurred in their respective sentences; so the correct answer was "no. " The lure sentences re sembled the experimental sentences in syn tactic form. An equal number resembled each of the eight experimental combina tions. Each experimental sentence was fol lowed by a two-alternative WH-question.
Eight material sets were formed by ran domly assigning one of the eight versions of each sentence set to each material set, such that each material set contained eight sen tences of each condition. The 64 experi mental sentences were randomly inter mixed with the 64 lure sentences (there were no filler sentences). All 128 sentences appeared in the same order across the eight material sets. Sixteen subjects were ran domly assigned to each material set so that each subject read only one version of a sen tence set.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to the procedure followed in Experiment 2 except that 250 ms after the offset of the last word in each sentence, the words Test Name appeared. This warning signal re mained on the screen for 750 ms. Then, 400 ms after it disappeared, the test name appeared. So, in Experiment 3, each test name appeared 1400 ms after the offset of the last word of its seiltence.
Subjects. Ninety-six undergraduates at the University of Oregon participated as 
Shared tense
Joan selected the wine after Kate ordered the food. After Kate ordered the food, Joan selected the wine. After Joan selected the wine, Kate ordered the food. Kate ordered the food after Joan selected the wine.
Differenr tense
Joan selected the wine after Kate had ordered the food. After Kate had ordered the food, Joan selected the wine. After Joan had selected the wine, Kate ordered the food. Kate ordered the food after Joan had selected the wine. one means of fulfilling a course require ment. Six additional subjects were replaced for failing to meet the criteria described in Experiment I. The 96 subjects whose data were analyzed answered, on the average, 89% of the comprehension questions cor rectly, and discriminated "yes" from "no" test names with an average d' of 3.9.
Shared tense

Results
The results are displayed in the fifth and sixth bars of Fig. I we observed an advantage of the first mentioned participant. We suggest that at that point, comprehenders had finished mapping the two substructures together, and the first clause was more accessible be cause its substructure serves as the founda tion for the whole sentence-level represen tation. These results support the structure build ing framework's assumptions about how comprehenders build mental representa tions of clauses. In particular, these results suggest that comprehenders represent each clause of a two-clause sentence in its own substructure. Comprehenders have great est access to information in the substruc ture that they are currently developing (i.e., the most recent clause). But at some point, the first clause becomes more accessible because the substructure representing the first clause of a two-clause sentence serves as a foundation for the whole sentence level representation.
However, an alternative explanation of these first three experiments is that we ob served changes in accessibility over time simply because we caught subjects at dif ferent stages in their cycles of rehearsing the two participants' names (e.g., "Tina ... Lisa ... Tina ... Lisa"). To rule out this explanation, we conducted a fourth ex periment in which we delayed the test point even longer for a total of 2000 ms.
Methods
Experiment 4 was identical to Experi ment 2 except that all test names appeared 2000 ms after the offset of their sentences' final words. More specifically, 250 ms after the offset of the last word in each sentence, the words Test Name appeared for 1250 ms. Then, 500 ms later, the test name appeared. One-hundred twenty subjects participated. Seven additional subjects were replaced for failing to meet the criteria described in Experiment I. The 120 sub jects whose data were analyzed answered, on the average, 86% of the comprehension questions correctly, and discriminated "yes" from "no" test names with an aver age d' of 3.9.
Results
The results are displayed in the two left most bars of Fig. I . As shown in Fig. I Our fourth experiment demonstrated that 2 s after comprehenders finish reading a two-clause sentence, participants from the first clause are still more accessible than participants from the second clause. In fact, the advantage of the first-mentioned participant is even greater 2000 ms after the sentences than it is 1400 ms afterward.
Thus, the advantage of the first-mentioned participant must be a relatively long-lived 6 As illustrated in Fig. I , subjects responded pro gressively faster as we delayed the test point. Most likely this reflects how much processing comprehend ers had to conclude before they could respond to the test name. Recall that with the coincident presenta tion, the test word appeared coincident with the last word of the sentence. Therefore, subjects had to first finish reading the last word of the sentence before they could respond to the test name. Because reaction times were measured from the onset of the last word in the sentence (which was also the onset of the test name), we assume that reaction times include the time required to finish reading the sentence. In contrast, when the test names were presented 1400 or 2000 ms after the offset of the last word of the sentence (and reaction times were measured from that point), we as sume that subjects had ample time to finish reading the sentence; therefore, reaction times were faster. characteristic of the representation of a sentence. According to the structure build ing framework, the advantage of the first mentioned participant arises because first mentioned participants form the founda tions for their sentence-level structures, and through them subsequent information is mapped onto the developing structure.
In contrast, the advantage of the most recent clause appears to be relatively short lived. It is observed only when we measure accessibility immediately after compre henders finish reading the second clause. According to the structure building frame work, the advantage of the most recent clause arises because comprehenders build a substructure to represent each clause of a two-clause sentence, and they have great est access to information represented in the substructure that they are currently devel oping.
So, when comprehension is viewed as structure building, these two seemingly contradictory phenomena-the advantage of the first-mentioned participant and the advantage of the most recent clause-are not mutually exclusive. In fact, according to the structure building framework, it should be possible to observe both phe nomena simultaneously. That was the goal in our fifth experiment.
In this fifth experiment, we measured the accessibility of each of four participants, for instance, Dave, Rick, John, and Bill in (16) Dave and Rick gathered the kin dling, and John and Bill set up the tent.
As in sentence (16), two participants were the conjoined subjects of the first clause (e.g., Dave and Rick), and two participants were the conjoined subjects of the second clause (e.g. , John and Bil[). In other words, two participants were the first-and second mentioned participants of the first clause, and two participants were the first-and sec ond-mentioned participants of the second clause.
According to the structure building framework, within both clauses we should observe an advantage of the first mentioned participant: That is, within each clause, the first-mentioned participants should be more accessible than the second mentioned participants. This is because the first of the two participants mentioned in each clause should form the foundation for their clause-level substructure.
In addition, according to the structure building framework, if we catch compre henders at the point where they are just fin ishing building their representations of the second clause, we should also observe an advantage of the most recent clause: That is, both participants from the second clause should be more accessible than both partic ipants from the first clause. This is because each clause of a two-clause sentence should be represented in its own substructure, and information should be most accessible from the substructure that comprehenders are currently developing.
Methods
Materials. We constructed 32 sentence sets. Each sentence set comprised four ver sions of a prototype sentence. The four ver sions resulted from factorially manipulating two factors: (I) whether the test name was the clause' s first-versus second-mentioned participant, and (2) whether the test name was from the first versus second clause. An example sentence set appears in Table 3 .
The verb phrases for the sentence sets were drawn from the pool of verbs used in the previous four experiments. All verbs were in the simple past tense, and all sen- , and half asked about the identity of two of the participants (e.g., "Who gath ered the kindling')" or "Who set up the tent?"). Four material sets were formed by ran domly assigning one of the four versions of each sentence set to a material set. This way, each prototype sentence occurred in all of its four versions across material sets, but it occurred in only one version within each material set. The 32 experimental sen tences were randomly intermixed with the 32 lure sentences. All 64 sentences ap peared in the same order across the four material sets. Twenty subjects were ran domly assigned to each material set so that each subject read only one version of a sen tence set.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to the procedure followed in Experiment 2 except that in order to present the more complex sentences of Experiment 5 at a slower rate, each word was presented for 400 ms (instead of 300 ms) plus 16.667 per character. Other than that change, all other timing was identical to Experiment 2, in cluding the fact that all test names appeared 150 ms after the offset of the final word in each sentence.
Subjects. Eighty undergraduates at the
University of Oregon participated as one means of fulfilling a course requirement.
Because the sentences in Experiment 5
were more complex than those of Experi ments I through 4, we lowered one criterion for replacing subjects from 90% accu racy at responding to experimental ("yes") and lure ("no") test names to 85% accu racy. Subjects still had to achieve 75% ac curacy at answering the two-choice com prehension questions. Six subjects were re placed. The 80 subjects whose data were analyzed answered, on the average, 85% of the comprehension questions correctly and discriminated "yes" versus "no" test names with an average d' of 2.8.
Results
The results are displayed in Fig. 2 . As illustrated in Fig. 2 , we observed an advan tage of the first-mentioned participant: For both clauses, the first-mentioned partici pants (M = 968, SE = 18, 93%) were sig nificantly more accessible than the second mentioned participants (M = 1018, SE = 17, 90%), minF'(l,89) = 13.49, p < .0005. As also illustrated in Fig. 2, 
EXPERIMENT 6
Our fifth experiment, like our first exper iment, demonstrated that immediately after a two-clause sentence, the most recently read clause is more accessible than an ear lier clause. This finding again supports the structure building framework's assump tions that each clause of a two-clause sen tence is represented in its own substruc ture, and comprehenders have greatest ac cess to information represented in the substructure that they are currently devel oping.
Our fifth experiment also demonstrated that when two participants are mentioned in the same clause, the first-mentioned par- tlctpant is more accessible. According to the structure building framework, this is be cause the first participant in each clause forms the foundation for its clause-level substructure. So, the advantage of the first-mentioned participant and the advantage of the most recent clause can occur simultaneously. However, according to the structure build ing framework, the advantage of the first mentioned participant is a relatively long lived characteristic of a sentence or clause, whereas the advantage of the most recent clause is observed only when accessibility is measured immediately after comprehen sion of the most recent clause. Therefore, if we again presented two-clause sentences that mention two participants in each clause. but if we measured accessibility a little later than we did in the fifth experi ment, we should no longer observe an ad vantage of the most recent clause; instead, we should observe only an advantage of the first-mentioned participant. We tested this prediction in our sixth and final experi ment.
Methods
Experiment 6 was identical to Experi ment 5 except that all test names appeared 2000 ms after the offset of their sentences' final words. More specifically, 250 ms after the offset of the last word in each sentence the words, Test Name, appeared for 1250 ms. Then, 500 ms later, the test name appeared. Eighty subjects participated. Seven additional subjects were replaced for failing to meet the criteria described in Ex periment 5. The 80 subjects whose data were analyzed answered, on the average, 83% of the comprehension questions accu rately, and discriminated "yes" from "no" test names with an average d' of 2.98.
Results
The results are displayed in Fig. 3 . As illustrated in Fig. 3 , with two-clause sen tences that mentioned two participants in each clause, we again observed an advan tage of the first-mentioned participant: For both clauses, first-mentioned participants (M = 1245, SE = 21, 93%) were signifi cantly more accessible than second mentioned participants (M = 1307, SE = 22, 91%), minF'(1,86) = 17.78, p < .0005. However, as also illustrated in Fig. 3, 
D ISCUSSION
These experiments support the following assumptions made by the structure building framework: Comprehenders represent each clause of a two-clause sentence in its own substructure. Comprehenders have great est access to information represented in the substructure that they are currently deve l oping; that is, they have the greatest access to the most recent clause. However, at some point, the first clause becomes more accessible than later clauses because the substructure representing the first clause of a two-clause sentence serves as a founda tion for the whole sentence-level represen tation.
Representing Clausal Dependencies
By saying that comprehenders represent each clause in its own substructure we are not suggesting that all substructures are equally independent. Rather, we envision that comprehenders build rich mental rep resentations in which some substructures are more closely connected than others. In particular, we suggest that more dependent clauses are represented in more connected substructures.
We tried to examine this proposal in the experiments reported here. We tried to in duce clause dependency by affixing subor dinating conjunctions and by varying the two clauses' tense. Yet despite our manip ulations, all our clauses were semantically very independent: The two clauses in each sentence conveyed actions that occurred at about the same time, lasted about the same period, and were of equal importance. Thus, semantically, the two clauses in each sentence were relatively independent.
Moreover, our clauses were functionally very independent. Indeed, they belong to the top tier of Tanenhaus and Carroll's dence. Tanenhaus and Carroll's top tier comprises independent main clauses and complete clauses with initial and medial subordinators. These were the type of clauses we explored in our experiments. Lower on Tanenhaus and Carroll's hierar chy are more dependent clauses. For in stance, their next tier comprises embedded clauses, such as relative clauses. Their third tier comprises nominalizations, and their bottom tier comprises noun phrases.
Experiments with clauses that are more dependent than the ones we examined here-that is, experiments with clauses lower on Tanenhaus and Carroll's hierar chy--<lo support our assumption that com prehenders capture clausal dependencies by building more closely connected sub structures.
For example, the more one clause de pends on another, the better that clause cues the recall of the other. So, after hear ing ( 17) Howard who revised the game rules/aggravated the old pros.
if comprehenders are given the cue, game rules, and their task is to say the word that came next, they say aggravated more rap idly if the first clause is a somewhat depen dent, sentential subject, as in (18) than if the first clause is a relative clause, as in (17) above. In other words, the more the first clause depends on the second, the bet ter the cue. Responses are faster still when the first clause is even more dependent, for instance, when the first clause is a nominal ization, as in (19) Howard' s revision of the game rules/aggravated the old pros (Carroll, Tanenhaus, & Bever, 1978) . Thus, the more dependent the previous clause the lower it is on Tanenhaus and Carroll's hierarchy-the better the last word of that clause primes the first word of the next clause. We suggest this is because the more one clause depends on another, the more closely comprehenders connect the two clausal substructures.
Our proposal that comprehenders repre sent more dependent clauses in more closely connected substructures is also sup ported by experiments that have explored the advantage of the most recent clause, but have explored the advantage with more dependent clauses than those we used here. For instance, the advantage of the most re cent clause predicts that immediately after comprehenders hear either sentence (20) or (2 1), the third clause will be most accessi ble.
(20) [ (24) Even though Ron hasn't seen many, bears are apparently his favorite animal.
Presumably this difference occurs because at the end of a clause comprehenders are completing a substructure, whereas at the beginning of a clause they are initiating one (and initiating a new substructure involves the time-consuming process of laying a foundation). However, this difference is at tenuated when clauses contain forward referring pronouns, such as the first clause in (22). In these situations, comprehenders identify a target word just as slowly at the end of a clause as at the beginning of a clause (Marslen-Wilson et al. , 1978) . Pre sumably, this is because when compre henders reach the end of more dependent clauses, they are not completing their sub structures; rather they are preparing to con nect that substructure to the next substruc ture.
To summarize, experiments with clauses that are more dependent than those we ma nipulated here support our proposal that comprehenders build rich mental represen tations in which some substructures are more closely connected than others. Fig. 2 to resemble a typical serial position curve. The first bar should be short (manifesting the primacy compo nent of the curve); the second bar should be somewhat longer; the third bar might be equally long as the second or perhaps slightly longer, and the fourth bar should be short, perhaps even the shortest (manifest ing the recency component).
Building Hierarchical Structures
But instead we see that the first bar is shorter than the second bar (manifesting the advantage of the first-mentioned partic ipant in the first clause), and the third bar is shorter than the fourth bar (manifesting the advantage of the first-mentioned partici pant in the second clause). Furthermore, we see that the third and fourth bars are shorter than the first and second bars (man ifesting the advantage of the most recent clause).
When we compare Fig. 2 with Fig. 3 we see that the third and fourth bars change almost like a unit. Both bars become taller with the increased test delay; however, the relationship between the third and fourth bar is maintained. Again, this is not the pat tern expected if the four participants are remembered only as four names in an un structured list. If that were the case, we might expect Fig. 3 to resemble a serial po sition curve with only the primacy compo nent: The first bar should be the shortest, and the remaining bars but should be either equally long or perhaps progressively longer. Instead the third bar is shorter than the fourth bar, just as the first bar is shorter than the second bar. We suggest that this pattern occurs because the first participant of each clause forms the foundation for its clause-level representation.
In what sense does the first-mentioned participant form a foundation? Perhaps it is in the sense that a first-born child, a first trip to Europe, or a fi rst romance earns a special status. All other children, trips to Europe, or romances are interpreted with reference to the initial one. So, by defini tion, later-occurring sentence participants must be understood with reference to the first-mentioned participant. Rick accompa nied Dave in gathering the kindling, and Bill accompanied John in setting up the tent.
We are not suggesting that the first mentioned participant is more important, simply that it came first and its precedence affects the subsequent representation.
The same privilege by precedence occurs with clauses-particularly clauses of equal status such as the ones we examined here.
Knowledge that John and Bill set up the tent is added to the knowledge that Dave and Rick gathered the kindling. Again, we are not suggesting that the first clause is more important, simply that it comes first and its precedence affects the subsequent representation.
Accessing Semantic Information
What type of information is represented in comprehenders' mental structures and substructures? In other words, what type of information becomes more or less accessi ble as comprehenders build clausal repre sentations? Traditionally, a trade-off be tween superficial (verbatim) information and more meaningful (semantic) informa tion was assumed. Verbatim information was assumed to be more accessible while comprehenders heard or read a clause but less accessible a short while later. In con trast, semantic information was assumed to be less accessible while comprehenders heard or read a clause but more accessible a short while later. In fact, some theories assumed that semantic information was un available until after comprehenders com pletely finished hearing or reading a clause.
However, semantic, lexical, and verba tim information all become more accessible at the same time, and they all become less accessible at the same time. In other words, there is no trade-off.
Indeed, the advantage of the most recent clause occurs at the same time for all three types of information. That is, all three types of information are more accessible while comprehenders are building their mental representations of one clause, and all three types of information become less accessible when comprehenders begin building their representations of another clause.
For instance, the word hammer is more accessible immediately after comprehend ers hear (26) We found the carton of nails and bolts, but the hammer and wrench were gone.
than it is immediately after comprehenders hear (27) The hammer and wrench were gone, but we found the carton of nails and bolts. This is the advantage of the most recent clause. The advantage occurs when the sentence and test word match in superficial form, for instance, when both the sentence and test word are written (as in our exper iments and Chang, 1980), or when both the sentence and test word are spoken (Caplan, 1972; von Eckardt & Potter, 1985) . More over, the advantage is equally strong when the sentence and test word match in lexical form but not superficial form, for instance, when the sentence is spoken and the test word is written (Caplan, 1972; von Eckardt & Potter, 1985) . In fact, the advantage is equally strong when the sentence and test word match only in semantic form, for in stance, when the sentence is spoken and the test "word" is a picture of a hammer 
Conclusion
The structure building framework can ac count for two seemingly contradictory sen tence comprehension phenomena: the ad vantage of the first -mentioned participant and the advantage of the most recent clause. We suggest that the advantage of the first-mentioned participant arises be cause first-mentioned participants form the foundations for their sentence or clause level substructures; through them subse quent information is mapped onto the de veloping substructure. The advantage of the most recent clause arises because com prehenders build a substructure to repre sent each clause of a two-clause sentence, and they have greatest access to informa tion represented in the substructure that they are currently developing.
Thus, when viewed from the perspective of the structure building framework, these two seemingly contradictory phenomena are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they in form us about the processes involved in comprehension and the nature of the repre sentations that comprehenders build.
However, it is important to note that the structure building framework accounts for these two phenomena by drawing on gen eral cognitive processes. Neither the pro cess we refer to as "laying a foundation" (and that we suggest accounts for the ad vantage of the first-mentioned participant) nor the process that we refer to as shifting to initiate a new substructure (and that we suggest accounts for the advantage of the most recent clause) is specific to language comprehension; both processes are in volved in comprehension in general. So, phenomena analogous to the advantage of the first-mentioned participant and the ad vantage of clause recency should be ob served during the comprehension of nonlin-guistic media. The crucial commonality is that the goal of comprehension is building a coherent, mental representation. To build this representation, comprehenders use ini tial information to lay a fo undation. Fur thermore, they often shift to initiate a new substructure. What is specific to sentences is that nouns (or participants) are important bases for representing sentences and can therefore serve as foundations, while clauses provide good units for substruc tures.
